“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”
This is the famous first line of the Gospel according to John. It’s so famous, some people actually mistake this sentence to be the first sentence of the Bible in general. What could this mean? Most theologians consider Λόγος (which is the original Greek for Word) to refer to the Holy Scripture and consequently see Christ as the incarnate Scripture. I won’t dispute that claim in this paper, but I do want to give some attention to another consideration for what this Λόγος might mean.
Apart from referring to Scripture, it might refer to the concept of information. Λόγος has the connotations of word, reason and plan. I would argue information is not dissimilar from those concepts. If we translate Λόγος with information, we get the sentence “In the beginning was Information, and Information was with God and Information was God.” Now, what could this mean? How does the concept of information relate to classical considerations of what God is? What even is information? In this paper I will delve into these questions, starting mainly from the work of Luciano Floridi who is quite an important figure in the philosophy of information (notably he wrote a book with that name).
What is information?
An approach to answer the question of what information is, is to look at the etymology of the word. Information is derived from the Latin composite informare which denotes bringing things in-form, i.e. information refers to things which are shaped, ordered, structured in one way or another. This is a rough conception of what information is, but as Floridi has noted “information ‘can be said in many ways’, just as being can (Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ.2).” The rough description I gave is in line with Haught, when he writes that “[i]n the broadest sense, ‘information’ can mean whatever gives form, order, pattern, or identity to something, whether it be an electron, crystal, the human mind, a civilization, or an economic system.” In this paper, I will limit myself to this sense of understanding information.
Information understood as in-form, means it can be opposed to the things that are not in-form. These are the things that are shapeless, patternless and/or chaotic. This opposition is quite useful to understand what information is. From this opposition, Floridi has made a list of properties which can be given to respectively information and entropy (i.e. disorder, chaos). (see fig. 1)
Why information?
Now that we have a rough conception of what information is, one might ask: why should we care? Yes, in the introduction I proposed that one of the most important texts in Scripture can refer to information, but this is in no way a justification of suddenly considering information in relation to the concept of God. As Floridi has noted, the study of information has long not been undertaken and has not yet claimed its place as a field besides studies of the classical ontological concepts unum, verum, bonum. Surely, the onset of Artificial Intelligence has made the interest in the field of information substantially higher, but this in itself is no reason to suddenly consider information in relation to the concept of God. Some might object that if God is information or has informational properties, this should already have been gathered from revelation. Why would a benevolent God withhold such knowledge regarding Her character?
We have however seen that human history plays a role in changing the conception of God. One prominent example has been the way in which the impassibility of God has been reconsidered due to events in the previous century. Due to the horrors of the Holocaust conceptions of God have changed in favour of a God that is suffering with the world. The fact that the world has become increasingly dynamic is also a reason to think of the world and therefore God as dynamic instead of a distant changeless Being. Why would this be different for information?
Aside from the rise of (thinking about) Artificial Intelligence another reason why information has become an important concept to consider is a development in physics. Physicists, like Erik Verlinde, have proposed a model of the universe which has information as its founding principle. Going against the grain of mainstream physics, Verlinde has proposed a model for explaining gravity which states that “[g]ravity is identified with an entropic force caused by changes in the information associated with the positions of material bodies.” If such a picture of nature is true, this means that information is not only a core concept in our digital world, but this also means that information is actually fundamental to this universe. If information is such a fundamental aspect of nature, one simply can not ignore this concept when considering God.
We have now roughly seen what information is and we have made the case why information should be considered when talking about the nature and character of God, in the next section we will consider some arguments for God as information or having information as its property.
Imago Dei argument for information as attributable to God
One argument for the idea that God is information or has the property of information is the so called imago Dei argument. Peels presents a similar argument for the idea that God has a sense of humor, his argument is presented as follows:
“(9) If adult, properly functioning human beings have property P and their having P does not issue from their finiteness or morally imperfect nature, then their having P is part of what it is to be created in the image of God. [prem.]
(10) If adult, properly functioning human beings’ having P is part of what it is to be created in the image of God, then God has P. [prem.]
(11) If adult, properly functioning human beings have property P and their having P does not issue from their finiteness or morally imperfect nature, then God has P. [from (9) and (10)]
(12) Adult, properly functioning human beings have a sense of humor. [prem.]
(13) To have a sense of humor does not issue from one’s being finite or morally imperfect. [prem.]
(14) God has a sense of humor. [from (11)–(13)]”
Now, of course, we’re not concerned with humor, but we are concerned with information. This argument presents a challenge: in this paper we have not yet decided on whether information is a property or something substantial. Humans have humor, but it seems weird to talk about humans having information. When someone says a human has information, it is usually meant that this person has information about something, but it doesn’t denote information as a property of a human being. If the imago Dei argument as presented by Peels necessarily must contain propositions referring to properties, one can not argue for information as something belonging to God.
I believe however that this is not necessary, the imago Dei argument works because it refers to aspects of human beings that are not following “from their finiteness or morally imperfect nature.” Those aspects can be properties, but it can also refer to human nature. We would like the imago Dei argument to work for our capacity to reason as well and usually rationality is considered to be a defining characteristic for human beings. One can say that a human has reason, but reason in this sense is not (merely) a property: we are rational beings. In the same sense, God is a rational being. How could we reconstruct the argument to work for information?
(1) If adult, properly functioning human beings are said to be X and their being X does not issue from their finiteness or morally imperfect nature, then their being X is part of what it is to be created in the image of God. [prem.]
(2) If adult, properly functioning human beings’ being X is part of what it is to be created in the image of God, then God has P. [prem.]
(3) If adult, properly functioning human beings are said to be X and their being X does not issue from their finiteness or morally imperfect nature, then God has P. [from (1) and (2)]
(4) Adult, properly functioning human beings are fundamentally information. [prem.]
(5) To be information does not issue from one’s being finite or morally imperfect. [prem.]
(6) God is fundamentally information. [from (3)–(5)]
Since Peels already quite forcefully has argued for these first two premises with regard to his imago Dei argument for humor, this paper will not defend these premises any further and take them as given.
Premise (4) is given in the theories of nature we have seen as proposed by e.g. Verlinde.
Premise (5) follows when we take into account that some fact, like 2+2=4, is a form of information which is not finite and which is morally neutral. There is actually a case to be made that information not only is morally neutral, a given state of affairs, but actually contributing towards perfection. This is something we will discuss in the next section.
For now, we can state that imago Dei holds for information and we should therefore conclude that God indeed is information.
Information as a perfection
We have seen that information represents some kind of order and we have argued for God being information using the imago Dei argument. We can also argue for God being information considering that information is good. To see this we take a look at the Information Ethics developed by Floridi. We have already seen in fig. 1 in which way the sphere of Information Ethics looks according to Floridi. Here we delve somewhat deeper into his Information Ethics.
What is Information Ethics? This theory of ethics starts from the assumption that agents in this universe have a responsibility to care for the structure and form of the universe. The structure and form of the universe of course being informational. As we have seen, information is contrasted with entropy, resulting in the following normative laws:
“1. Entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere (null law)
- Entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere
- Entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere
- Information welfare ought to be promoted by extending (information quantity), improving (information quality) and enriching (information variety) the infosphere”
Entropy is, so to speak, the bad guy in this ethical approach. Here we have a theory which states that it is our duty to create more, better and richer information. This ethical theory is presented in such a way that it applies not only to human beings, but to actors in general. If we assume this theory to be correct, which for the sake of argument we do, this means a perfect being is a being which causes the complete opposite of entropy. Now, one could argue that for a perfect being to cause this, the perfect being does not need to be itself the complete opposite of entropy. This perfect being could simply cause information but not be information itself. Just like I can cause a wave in the ocean without myself being this wave. However, there seem to be only two options: something either is information or is entropy. If the perfect being causes the opposite of entropy, it needs to be the opposite of entropy, otherwise it is entropy and as the first rule states: entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere.
This ethical approach gives way to an understanding of God as information that has some major implications down the road. If we understand the perfect being as the being that promotes information welfare through high quantity, quality and variety, this gives us a sense of why there is creation. If we take the classical notion of the perfectly good, this doesn’t give us an indication of why such a perfect being needs other beings: if a perfectly good being needs other beings, it suggests it is not itself perfect without other beings. There is a paradox here which can not easily be solved, but this ethical approach shows us that a perfect being is perfect when and if it enriches the world with information. This enrichment does not do away with the perfect character of God, but actually gives way to God being more perfect (if something like that is conceivable).
We could take this further and suggest that the trinity, the idea that God is one and three at the same time, is a more perfect conception of God than monotheism. A being which is one-and-three is obviously more in quantity (insofar as God is three), obviously diverse (the Holy Father, Son, Spirit) and it could be argued that such a conception of God has more quality, because it deepens our understanding of God.
We can see how God as information does not only fit with insights from natural science, but we can also see how God as information guides us towards a Christian (trinitarian) conception of God. Of course, one could object that if a perfect being is diverse, it needs to be not only one-and-three but one-and-many, which is in a sense the conception of the divine in hindu practices. This objection holds, in a sense, but we can argue that one-and-three is a manner in which the perfect being is one-and-many and as such the trinitarian conception of God is not lesser than a multiplicity conception of God. It is, however, better than a purely monotheistic conception of God.
In conclusion
There is no room in this paper to delve into the relation between God as information and God understood as omniscient and omnipotent, but I’ll hint that understanding God as information will solve a paradox which arises when God is understood as perfectly good, omniscient and omnipotent.
Lastly, I want to reflect on how God as information relates to traditional conceptions of God. Although thinking about information is quite recent, presenting God as information is quite similar to scholastic traditions which present God as a perfect intellect. So, although the concept of information might sound unfamiliar to the ears of theologians, I think this way of thinking about God also brings in very old considerations about how God is.
We started our discussion whether God is information with a citation from scripture which could indicate that God is indeed information. Theologians might object that this passage is from a disputed gnostical outlook on the bible, but I think the arguments we have presented in favor of God as information are evidence that this passage can indeed be understood in such a way. Information is fundamentally in this world, of this world, but also behind this world. God, understood as a perfect being, is perfectly information.
Literature
Floridi, L. (1999). Information ethics: On the philosophical foundation of computer ethics. In: Ethics and Information Technology, 1(1), 33-56. Retrieved from https://www-proquest-com.vu-nl.idm.oclc.org/docview/222249101?accountid=10978
Floridi, L. (2008). Information. In: The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information, L. Floridi (Ed.). doi:10.1002/9780470757017.ch4
Haught, J. F. (2014). Information, theology, and the universe. In: Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics (Canto Classics). Davies, P., & Gregersen, N. (Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107589056
Nagasawa, Y. (2018). Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism (chapter 1: 7-39). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Peels, R. (2015). Does god have a sense of humor? In: Faith and Philosophy, 32(3), 271–292.
Scrutton, A. P. (2011). Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility. New York: Continuum
Verlinde, E. (2011) On the origin of gravity and the laws of Newton. In: Journal of High Energy Physics 2011, 29. https://doi.org/10.1007/JHEP04(2011)029
This was a paper written for the course The Nature and Character of God by Rik Peels of the MA Theology and Religious Studies at the Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam
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